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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Petitioner was convicted of retail theft while armed 
with a dangerous weapon, a crime against property, and aggravated 
assault, a crime against a person. Both crimes occurred in the 
same criminal episode. Is it constitutionally proportionate to 
sentence petitioner to 1 to 15 years for the retail theft while 
sentencing him to 0 to five years for the aggravated assault? 
2. Was exclusion of expert testimony as to eyewitness 
identification proper considering the identification was made 
nine and one half months after the offense!? 
REFERENCE TO REPORTS OF THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 140 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10. 
GROUNDS OF JURISDICTl6N 
The decision sought to be reviewed was entered July 13, 1990 
in the Utah Court of Appeals. An order extending the time to 
file a petition for writ of certiorari until September 12, 1990 
was entered in this court on August 13, 1990. Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-4 provides for review of Utah Court of Appeals 
decisions by petition of writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
U.S.C.A. Const, amend. VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
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imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted. 
Utah Const, art. I. Section 9 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall 
not be imposed: nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-412(1)(a)(iii) 
Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter 
shall be punishable as a second degree felony if the actor is 
armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was on put on trial on the 7th and 8th days of 
March, 1989, before a jury for the charges of Retail Theft, 
Possession of a Concealed Weapon and Aggravated Assault. The 
case against defendant was based on eyewitness testimony by two 
security officers for Sears, Officer Dial, whose testimony goes 
from page 3 to 69 of the trial transcript, and Officer Maddox, 
whose testimony goes from page 70 to page 96 of the transcript, 
and a videotape of the perpetrator, introduced into evidence on 
page 67 of the trial transcript. Officer Dial arrested the 
defendant nine and one half months after the commission of the 
offense. Page 60 of the trial transcript. During the time 
between the incident and arrest, Officer Dial viewed the 
videotape of the perpetrator somewhere between 30 and 50 times. 
Page 36 of the trial transcript. 
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Defendant sought to have Edward Bartdn testify as an expert 
witness as to eyewitness identification, and a proffer of 
evidence was made, pages 116 to 136 of the transcript. The trial 
judge granted the prosecution motion to exclude the testimony of 
Mr. Barton. Page 143 to 145 of the transcript. 
Defendant was convicted on all counts. Page 164 and 165 of 
the trial transcript. 
An appeal was taken to the Utah Court of Appeals on the 
basis that the expert testimony as to eyewitness identification 
was improperly excluded, that the conviction of possession of a 
concealed weapon was a duplication of the conviction for retail 
theft while armed with a dangerous weapon, and that the sentence 
of 1 to 15 years for the retail theft conviction was 
disproportionate to the point of unconstitutionality. See the 
statement of the issues in Appellant's brief before the Court of 
Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for possession 
of a concealed weapon and upheld the trial court on the other 
matters brought before it on appeal. Pag^s 5, 10, 11 and 12 of 
the Court of Appeals Opinion as included in the appendix. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. The Constitutions of both the United States of America 
and the State of Utah require that punishment for crime be 
proportionate to the offense. 
The 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
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Section 9 of Article 1 of the Utah Constitution prohibit cruel 
and unusual punishment. Encompassed within the concept of cruel 
and unusual punishment is the concept of proportionality of the 
offense to punishment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 
3001, 77 L.Ed. 2d 637 (1983) and State v. Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 
(Utah 1986). Factors to consider in determining proportionality 
of an offense to the punishment include the gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty. Bishop at 269. In 
general, it is accepted that murder is more serious than other 
crimes and that crimes against persons are more serious than 
crimes against property, and that crimes of violence are more 
culpable than those that do not involve violence. Bishop at 269. 
Accordingly, violent crimes against persons should be punished 
more severely than non-violent crimes against property; and 
conversely, non-violent crimes against property should be 
punished less severely than violent crimes against persons. 
2. Issues of proportionality of punishment can arise as to 
different offenses within one criminal episode. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's convictions for 
retail theft and aggravated assault while reversing his 
conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous weapon. See the 
bottom paragraph on page 10 of the typewritten opinion attached 
in the appendix. According to a strict application of the 
present statutory scheme of the state of Utah, because the 
perpetrator was armed with a deadly weapon in this case, the 
retail theft conviction is a Second degree felony carrying a 
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penalty of 1 to 15 years in the state prison. U.C.A. Sec. 76-6-
606 and U.C.A. 76-6-412(1)(iii). Without the complications of 
the dangerous weapon, the crime would have been a class B 
misdemeanor because the value of the merchandise taken was less 
than $100.00. (The value of the merchandise taken was $29.98. 
Trial transcript on page 30.) The aggravated assault was a 
felony of the third degree, punishable by 0 to 5 years in the 
state prison. (The aggravated assault consisted of the 
perpetrator pointing a handgun at the store security officers. 
Pages 21-22 and 76-79 of the trial transcript.) 
The disproportionality of the punishment for these two 
offenses, which arose in the same episode, constitutes the basis 
for this petition for review. The Court of Appeals did not 
consider the interplay of the different otfenses in this matter 
when they considered the proportionality t>f the punishment. Page 
11 of the opinion attached in the appendix. 
3. The nonviolent offense against property in this matter 
is being punished more severely than the violent crime against 
persons. 
The strict application of the Statutorily prescribed 
sentences leads to the result that defendant is punished more for 
a non-violent crime against $29.98 worth of light switches than 
for a violent crime against two security officers. The 
merchandise was already returned to the officers when the 
aggravated assault occurred. Page 20 of the trial transcript. 
The punishment is therefore disproportionate according to the 
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guidelines from Bishop that crimes against persons be punished 
more severely than crimes against property and that violent 
crimes be punished more severely than non-violent crimes. 
4. Changing the classification of retail theft of less than 
$100 from a Class B misdemeanor to a Second Degree felony due to 
possession of a deadly weapon is permissible only because of the 
potential that a crime against property could easily change into 
a crime against a person. 
The Court of Appeals in its opinion correctly states that 
retail theft while armed with a deadly weapon is a grave offense. 
Page 11 of the attached opinion. The gravity of the offense is 
caused by the potential that the weapon could easily be directed 
against a person during the commission of the offense. No other 
justification can be made for the change of classification. 
5. Once the aggravated assault was committed in this 
matter, there was no longer any justification to treat the retail 
theft as a second degree felony. 
Because the weapon was directed against persons, there no 
longer remained any potential that it might be directed against 
persons. The potential became a reality. There only existed a 
potential that it would harm a person. Which potentiality is 
contemplated by the crime of assault and punished as part of the 
crime of assault. Accordingly, punishment of the theft as a 
felony is disproportionate. 
6. The length of time between the offense and the arrest 
gives rise to circumstances mandating the admission of expert 
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testimony as to eyewitness identification. 
In recent years, there has been a growing acknowledgment 
that eyewitness identification is not as reliable as once 
thought. Although the Court did approve a cautionary jury 
instruction in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), that step 
did not go far enough to counter public misperceptions as to 
eyewitness identification. 
Because of the length of time between the incident and the 
arrest(9 1/2 months), and the fact that the arresting officer 
had viewed the videotape some 30 to 50 times in the interim, 
possibly causing a situation where the officer was making an 
identification from the videotape rather than from his 
recollection of the actual incident, expert testimony as to 
eyewitness identification was crucial to protect the right of 
defendant to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
When viewing the separate offenses that the defendant has 
been convicted of as one episode, the sentences for the two 
offenses are not constitutionally proportionate with respect to 
each other. Considering the two as one episode also removes the 
justification to treat the retail theft conviction as a felony 
conviction. The retail theft conviction must be changed to a 
Class B misdemeanor with a corresponding change of sentence. 
Because the eyewitness identification at defendant's trial 
was tainted by the passage of time and the possible replacement 
7 
of visual recollection with a black and white video image, expert 
testimony was needed to protect the interests of defendant in 
having a fair trial. 
Dated this 12th day of September, 1990. 
Evan Hurst 
Certificate of service 
I certify that I hand-delivered four copies of the foregoing 
petition, postage—pif*'f^4-4T—f irist-rl aff^  mail this 12th day of 
September, 1990, to: 
Paul Van Dam 
Sandra Sjogren 
Barbara Bearnson 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Evan R. Hurst 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles Louis Kinsey, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
^V* of *« Court 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890296-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Evan R. Hurst, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Barbara Begrnson, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Newey.1 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant Charles Louis Kinsey appeals his convictions of 
retail theft, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989); aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 
1989); and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class B 
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 
1989). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
On December 9, 1987, Wayne Dial, a Se^ lt Lake County 
sheriff's deputy who was also working as a [security guard at 
Sears, observed and recorded on a closed-circuit television 
security system a man, dressed in a black Waist-length jacket, 
a green military fatigue-style shirt, blue jeans, and a black 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge, sitting by 
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) 
(Supp. 1989). 
nylon web belt, walking through the store carrying electrical 
items. Dial observed the man enter the men's restroom carrying 
the electrical items and then exit without the electrical items 
in his hands. Dial notified another security officer, Tim 
Maddox, that a possible theft was in progress and that the 
suspect was leaving the store. Dial left the video monitor and 
pursued the suspect. 
Outside, Dial confronted the suspect, identified himself 
as a security agent for Sears, and told him that he wanted to 
talk with him about the items he took from the store. 
Meanwhile, Maddox joined Dial. The suspect handed Dial two 
electrical items, valued at $29.98 and packaged in Sears 
containers. Dial then searched the suspect and asked if he had 
any weapons. The suspect broke away from Dial and pulled a 
large-caliber handgun from a holster concealed underneath his 
jacket. The suspect held the gun in combat position and 
pointed it back and forth at Dial and Maddox for three to five 
seconds. He then ran into a nearby mall entrance and escaped. 
At the time of this incident, the weather was bright and 
sunny, and neither Dial nor Maddox were impaired in observing 
the suspect. 
After the incident, Dial made extensive efforts to locate 
the suspect. He viewed the videotape of the theft several 
times, went through files of those licensed to carry concealed 
weapons, and showed the videotape to numerous other law 
enforcement officers. Maddox also saw the videotape a number 
of times. 
Nearly a year later, on September 26, 1988, Dial, who 
also worked as a security guard for Harmon's grocery store, 
was beginning his shift when he saw Kinsey and immediately 
recognized him as the suspect. Kinsey was wearing a green 
military fatigue-style shirt, blue jeans, and a black nylon web 
belt. Dial arrested him. 
Kinsey was subsequently charged with retail theft, 
possession of a concealed weapon, and aggravated assault. He 
was tried before a jury on March 7 and 8, 1989. 
During trial, Kinsey claimed that he was innocent and the 
victim of mistaken identity. He testified that he did not know 
what he did on December 9, 1987, but denied having gone to 
Sears or having committed the theft. Both Dial and Maddox, 
however, positively identified Kinsey as the suspect. The 
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prosecution showed the videotape of the theft to the jurors, 
Kinsey unsuccessfully sought to introduce the testimony of 
Edward M. Barton, an expert on eyewitness identification. 
Following the presentation of the evidence and at the request 
of both parties, the trial court gave a cautionary instruction 
on eyewitness identification to the jury. 
The jury found Kinsey guilty on all three charges. On 
April 7, 1989, he was sentenced to the following concurrent 
sentences: one to fifteen years for retail theft, up to five 
years for aggravated assault, and up to six months for carrying 
a concealed weapon. 
Kinsey brought this appeal, raising the following 
issues: (1) Is a cautionary instruction bufficient when 
eyewitness identification is an issue in a criminal case? (2) 
Did the trial court err in excluding Kinsey1s proffered expert 
testimony as to eyewitness identification? (3) Was Kinsey 
improperly convicted and sentenced twice for the same act? (4) 
Is punishment of one to fifteen years proportionate to the 
theft of merchandise valued at less than $30? 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE CAUTIONARY JURY INSTRUCTION 
Kinsey argues that a cautionary jury instruction listing 
criteria for a jury to consider in evaluating eyewitness 
identification testimony is insufficient because of the 
limitations inherent in eyewitness identification. Kinsey, 
therefore, concludes that the trial court erred in excluding 
his proffered expert testimony concerning these limitations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that there are 
inherent weaknesses in eyewitness identification, and that 
jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these weaknesses. 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 1986). Therefore, 
trial courts are required to give a cautionary instruction when 
eyewitness identification is a central iss\ie in the case and 
the defense requests such an instruction. Id. at 492. 
However, contrary to Kinsey1s argument, the supreme court has 
not extended the cautionary instruction requirement to include 
additional expert testimony concerning eyewitness 
identification. 
It is generally held that the trial court has discretion 
to determine the suitability of expert testimony in a case. 
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah Ct. App. 
890296-CA 3 
1989). The trial court may exclude even relevant expert 
testimony if "its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
As a corollary, "whether expert testimony should be 
allowed as to the merits of eyewitness identification is within 
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 1982).2 Although a defendant has a right 
to have witnesses, including experts, testify in his or her 
behalf, such expert testimony, which is applicable to any crime 
and does not deal with the specific facts of the defendant's 
case, is in the nature of a lecture to the jury as to how it 
should judge the evidence. State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 481 
(Utah 1981). A trial court's conclusion that expert testimony 
would amount to such a lecture, and its subsequent refusal to 
admit such testimony into evidence, is not an abuse of 
discretion. Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 61. This is particularly 
true where there has been no showing that the excluded expert 
testimony would probably have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict. Id. 
Kinsey's proffered expert witness, Edward M. Barton, 
testified that he was not familiar with either the defendant or 
the facts of this case, and admitted that his testimony would 
be in the form of a lecture to the jury with regard to 
eyewitness identification in general. Kinsey did not show that 
the proffered testimony would have had a substantial influence 
in bringing about a different verdict. Therefore, we conclude 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
Kinsey's proffered expert testimony regarding eyewitness 
identification. 
In setting guidelines for a proper eyewitness 
identification instruction, the Utah Supreme court stated that 
a proper instruction should sensitize the 
jury to the factors that empirical 
research have shown to be of importance in 
determining the accuracy of eyewitness 
identifications . . . [including] not only 
2. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), is a pre-Long 
case, but because the Long holding only dealt with the issue of 
cautionary instructions regarding eyewitness identification, it 
does not extend to this issue. 
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the externals, like the quality of the 
lighting and the time available for 
observation, but also the internal or 
subjective factors, such as the likelihood 
of accurate perception, storage and 
retrieval of the information by a 
witness. For example, an instruction 
should address the following commonly 
accepted areas of concern: (1) the 
opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's 
capacity to observe the event, including 
his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product 
of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the 
event being observed and the likelihood 
that the witness would perceive, remember 
and relate it correctly. This last area 
includes such factors as whether the event 
was an ordinary one in the mind of the 
observer during the time it was observed, 
and whether the race of the actor was the 
same as the observer's. 
Long, 721 P.2d at 492-93. Our examination of the trial court's 
instruction^ convinces us that the instruction fully complied 
with the standards set forth in Long. Therefore, we conclude 
that the trial court acted properly in refusing to admit the 
proffered expert testimony and in instructing the jury. 
3. The trial court gave the following eyewitness 
identification instruction: 
In judging the weight of the 
testimony and credibility of eyewitnesses 
testifying to the identity of the person 
who committed an alleged crime, you are 
instructed that identification testimony 
is an expression of belief or impression 
by the witness. 
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II. CONVICTION TWICE FOR THE SAME ACT 
Kinsey maintains that he was improperly convicted of 
and sentenced for two offenses which involved one act: retail 
theft, which became a second degree felony because of his 
possession of a deadly weapon at the time of the theft, and 
carrying a concealed weapon. 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
Many factors affect the accuracy of 
identification. In considering what weight 
to give the testimony of an identifying 
witness, you should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate 
opportunity to observe the criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you may consider: 
a. the length of time the witness 
observed the actor; 
b. the distance between the witness 
and the actor; 
c. the extent to which the actor's 
features were visible and 
undisguised; 
d. the light or lack of light at the 
place and time of observation; 
e. the presence or absence of 
distracting noises or activity 
during the observation; 
f. any other circumstances affecting 
the witness1 opportunity to 
observe the person committing the 
crime. 
2. Did the witness have the capacity 
to observe the person committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you may 
consider whether the witness1 capacity was 
impaired by: 
890296-CA 6 
The principal test for determining whether an offense 
is a lesser included offense involves a comparison of the 
statutory elements of each crime. State v. Larocco, 135 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 16, 18 (1990). An offense is included in the 
charged offense when "it is established by proof of the same 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
a. stress or fright at the 
time of observation; 
b. personal motivations, 
biases or prejudices; 
c. uncorrected visual defects; 
d. fatigue or injury; 
e. drugs or alcohol. 
You may also consider whether the 
witness is of a different race phan the 
criminal actor. Identification by a 
person of a different race may be less 
reliable than identification by a person 
of the same race. 
3. Was the witness sufficiently 
attentive to the criminal actor at the 
time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you may 
consider whether the witness knew that a 
crime was taking place during the time he 
or she observed the actor. Even if the 
witness had adequate opportunity and 
capacity to observe the criminal actor, he 
or she may not have done so unless he or 
she was aware that a crime was being 
committed. 
4. Was the witness* identification 
of the defendant completely the product of 
his or her own memory? 
In answering this question, you may 
consider: 
890296-CA 7 
or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged," Duran v. Cook, 788 P.2d 
1038, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(3) (1978)); see also Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
17. Thus, we need to determine whether Kinsey could have 
committed second-degree-felony retail theft without 
necessarily having committed the offense of carrying a 
concealed weapon. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 877 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
a. the length of time that passed 
between the witness1 original 
observation and his or her 
identification of the defendant; 
b. the witness1 mental capacity and 
state of mind at the time of the 
identification; 
c. the witness' exposure to opinions, 
descriptions or identifications given 
by other witnesses, to photographs or 
newspaper accounts, or to any other 
information or influence that may 
have affected the independence of his 
or her identification; 
d. any instances where the witness, or 
any eyewitness to the crime, failed 
to identify the defendant; 
e. any instances when the witness, or 
any eyewitnesses to the crime, gave a 
description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's 
appearance; 
e. the circumstances under which the 
defendant was presented to the 
witness for identification. 
f. Was the witness1 identification of 
the defendant corroborated by other 
evidence? 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1989), a 
person commits second-degree-felony retail theft when he 
commits retail theft as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602(1) 
(Supp. 1989)4, and "[the] value of the property or services 
(Footnote 3 continued) 
You may take into account that an 
identification made by the defendant from 
a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an 
identification made from the defendant 
being presented alone to the witness. 
The burden of proving that the 
defendant is the person who committed the 
crime is on the prosecution. If, after 
considering all the evidence you have 
heard from the prosecution and from the 
defense, including evaluating the 
eyewitness testimony in light of the 
considerations listed above, you must find 
him not guilty. 
If, on the other hand, you have no 
such reasonable doubt as to his identity, 
and you find all of the other elements of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find him guilty. 
4. The elements of retail theft are set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989): 
A person commits the offense of retail theft 
when he knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of 
retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit 
of such merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise . . . . 
890296-CA 9 
stolen exceeds $1,000; . . • [the] property stolen is a firearm 
or an operable motor vehicle; or . . . [the] actor is armed 
with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-419 (1978). A person commits the crime of carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-504 (Supp. 1989), a class B misdemeanor, by carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon. 
Kinsey took electrical goods with a value of $29.98 
while armed with a deadly weapon. The only reason his offense 
was a second degree felony was because of his possession of the 
weapon. Evidence that Kinsey was carrying a concealed weapon 
during the theft, which he took out of concealment and used 
during the aggravated assault, was used to establish the 
elements of all three offenses of which he was convicted. 
A secondary test is required where crimes standing in a 
greater-lesser relationship have multiple variations so that a 
greater-lesser relationship exists between some variations but 
not between others. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18; 
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877. This test requires the court to 
consider the evidence in determining whether the greater-lesser 
relationship exists between the specific variations of the 
crimes actually proven at trial. State v. Young, 780 P.2d 
1233, 1240-41 (Utah 1989). In the present case, the variation 
of second-degree-felony retail theft at issue, being armed with 
a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, results 
in a greater-lesser relationship between second-degree-felony 
retail theft and carrying a concealed weapon because possession 
and use of a concealed weapon was shown to establish both 
offenses. 
Where two crimes are such that the greater cannot be 
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser, the 
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both. State v. 
Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Bradley, 
752 P.2d at 877; State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 
1986). He may be convicted of the offense charged or an 
offense included in the offense charged, but not both. Duran, 
788 P.2d at 1039. Therefore, Kinsey should not have been 
convicted of both crimes. See Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
18. M[W]hen a defendant has been improperly convicted of both 
the greater and the included offense, the conviction on the 
included offense is treated as mere surplusage and the 
conviction of the greater offense remains unaffected." 
Bradley, 752 P.2d at 877. Therefore, we reverse Kinsey's 
conviction of the lesser included offense, carrying a 
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concealed weapon, but affirm his conviction for second degree 
felony retail theft. 
III. PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 
Kinsey alleges that his sentence of one to fifteen 
years is so disproportionate to the offense of the theft of 
$29.98 in merchandise as to be unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has held that a criminal sentence 
must be proportionate to the crime for whibh the defendant has 
been convicted. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 
3001, 3009-10 (1983). However, reviewing Courts should grant 
substantial deference to the broad authority given 
legislatures to determine the types of punishments for crimes 
and to the broad discretion granted trial courts for 
sentencing convicted criminals, id. at 290, 103 S. Ct. at 
3009. In so doing, the reviewing court should look first to 
the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, 
and then compare the sentences imposed on other criminals 
first in the same and then in other jurisdictions. Id. at 
292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011; State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 
(Utah 1986). 
Defendant argues that his conviction of second degree 
retail theft was for the theft of $29.98 worth of merchandise, 
for which he received one to fifteen years of imprisonment. 
Defendant errs in minimizing his offense: he was convicted of 
second degree retail theft for the theft of $29.98 worth of 
merchandise and being armed with a deadly weapon in the course 
of the theft. While the dollar amount of the merchandise is 
relatively insignificant, and for which the one to fifteen 
year sentence would, indeed, be disproportionate, being armed 
with a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime, a 
grave offense, is not insignificant. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-412(a)(iii) (Sunp. 1989), all theft offenses in which 
the actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the 
theft are classified as second degree felonies. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (Supp. 1989) specifies that a person 
convicted of a second degree felony may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of "not less than one 
year nor more than 15 years." "Only rarely will a statutorily 
prescribed punishment be so disproportionate to the crime that 
the sentencing statute is unconstitutional." Bishop, 717 P.2d 
at 269. We find that the penalty is not harsh in relationship 
to the gravity of the crime and that it necessarily compares 
with sentences given other defendants charged with possession 
of a weapon during the commission of a theft. We do not find 
890296-CA 11 
the statutorily prescribed punishment to be unconstitutional 
in thisx^ -rSslTNand, so, find g^nsey's argument to be without 
merij 
;3*-~M**£^ 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge/ // 
/ . ? 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
• ^ • / /_!_ <_• \ j A 
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